Church introduced -calculus in the beginning of the thirties as a foundation of mathematics and map theory from around 1992 ful lled that primary aim.
Introduction
As mentioned in the abstract, Church introduced -calculus 4, 5, 6] in the beginning of the thirties as a foundation of mathematics and map theory from around 1992 ful lled that primary aim.
In the meanwhile, -terms have shown very useful for expressing semantics in computer science, but there has been no natural choice of a theory for reasoning about these -terms.
In the lack of such a natural choice, computer science has turned to syntactic methods in which one reasons about the structure and conversion of -terms rather than their meaning.
Mathematics, on the contrary, has had set theory which allows to reason about sets rather than syntax. Set theory o ers the luxury of referential transparency, in which every term has a meaning and every term implicitly denotes that meaning.
Map theory resembles set theory in that it assigns meaning to -terms and treats -terms in a referentially transparent fashion. Map theory also resembles set theory when comparing metamathematical power: For every consistent set theory Z there is a consistent map theory M more powerful than Z and vice versa. The deepest di erence between set and map theory shows up in the treatment of in nite looping: Russell's sentence fx j x 6 2 xg 2 fx j x 6 2 xg is just a term that takes in nitely long time to compute, but set theory deals with this sentence by forbidding it rather than taking its value serious. Map theory, on the contrary, assigns meaning to the corresponding term ( x::(xx))( x::(xx)).
Map theory is not a marriage of convenience between -calculus and set theory 7] . Rather, map theory is a theory based entirely on -calculus in which, among other, set membership, logical connectives, and quanti cation over all sets are de nable concepts and in which all axioms and inference rules of ZFC are provable without resort to any syntactical considerations.
Map theory has the potential to serve as a foundation of both mathematics (due to its power that is equivalent to that of set theory) and of computer science (due to its treatment of -terms). Set and map theory are both inherently di cult to learn due to their level of abstraction, but set theory has the advantage of a century of pedagogical engineering that has made it easier to approach. On the contrary, the version of map theory from 1992 appears as a somewhat random collection of axioms that accidentally have the power of set theory and accidentally describe -terms.
Since 1992 it has turned out, however, that map theory is a natural choice of a theory of -calculus. More speci cally, it has turned out that every su ciently what is now known as Scott domains he was fully aware that the notion could be generalised to -Scott domains, but did not publish this nding as he saw no application of them at that time. Hence, in some sense, a -based foundation of mathematics has been around for a long time without anybody recognising it.
The present paper presents a new version of map theory which will be referred to as MTC (Map Theory with Classical maps) as opposed to the version from 1992 which will be referred to as MTW (Map Theory with Well-founded maps). The axioms of MTC are simpler and better motivated than those of MTW. The step from MTW to MTC is intended as a step in the direction of a theory that is easier to learn and teach. The paper focuses on the semantics of MTC and explains this semantics on basis of -Scott domains.
Di erences with Churchs approach
It is a pity that Church did not nd a theory like map theory right away since that could have saved a lot of work in computer science. There are, however, three good reasons why that did not happen, and these reasons are stated in the next three sections.
Inclusion of non-functions
The rst reason is that Churchs theory may be seen as a theory about functions only, and as such is a theory about only one concept. Classical logic is built around the distinction between truth and falsehood, i.e. the semantic distinction between two concepts. The semantic nature of classical logic and set theory stems from this distinction. -calculus, on the contrary, deals with functions only, and in a theory with only one concept it is impossible to make a semantic distinction. For that reason, -calculus can merely deal with the provability or non-provability of the equivalence of -terms which is syntactic of nature.
In map theory, this problem is solved by insisting that the universe of map theory must contain at least one non-function. Just one non-function is enough to make a distinction, namely a distinction between functions and non-functions. In map theory, the minimalistic approach has been taken to include only one non-function.
Having both functions and non-functions in map theory allows to represent truth and falsehood, and the convention has been chosen to let functions represent falsehood and let non-functions represent truth. This convention has been chosen very carefully on basis of what makes de nitions inside map theory easiest to read, but this issue will not be treated here.
Since there is only one non-function in map theory, it is convenient to introduce a name for that non-function, and since the non-function represents truth, the name T has been chosen.
In addition to functions and non-functions, the universe of map theory contains an element which is neither a function, nor a non-function. That element is denoted ? and represents in nite looping. This element violates the axiom of Tertium Non Datur, which in this context says that every object is either a function of a non-function. Nevertheless map theory is still classical of nature because it has another axiom called Quartum Non Datur which says that any map is either a function or T or ?, there is no fourth possibility.
The inclusion of the non-function T in map theory is a trivial step, but it is a step that is very important for the semantic nature of the theory.
Set abstraction versus -abstraction
Set theory has set abstraction fx j p(x)g and -calculus has -abstraction x:p(x). It is tempting to identify the two kinds of abstraction and try to represent the class fx j p(x)g by x:p(x), i.e. to represent classes by their characteristic functions. This approach, however, has not succeeded, and set abstraction and -abstraction seem to be two completely di erent kinds of abstraction.
In map theory, a function g does not represent the class fx j g(x) = Tg. Rather, g represents the class fg(x) j x 2 Sg where S is a xed class of maps. In MTW, S is the class W of well-founded maps, and in MTC, S is the class C of classical maps. fg(x) j x 2 Sg contains at least one element, so to allow to represent the empty set, the non-function T is taken to represent that set.
With this encoding, all sets of ZFC can be represented by well-founded maps in MTW and by classical maps in MTC. And, opposite, all well-founded maps in MTW and all classical maps in MTC represent sets. Classes may also be represented, but they are represented by maps that are not well-founded/classical.
In conclusion, the non-identi cation of set abstraction and -abstraction has been an important point in turning -calculus into a foundation.
Selection of well-behaved maps
The third problem in turning -calculus into a foundation of mathematics was to nd a class S of maps that was su ciently well-behaved to represent the sets of ZFC. In MTW, the class W of well-founded maps was chosen and in MTC, the class C of classical maps was chosen.
Insisting that fg(x) j x 2 Sg should be a set of ZFC for all g 2 S puts many restrictions on S, and insisting that all sets of ZFC should be representable by an element of S puts strong requirements on the size and richness of S. Nevertheless, these restrictions by no means determine S uniquely, and nding a natural S is no trivial task.
Relation between MTW and MTC
One advantage of MTC over MTW is that eleven complicated axioms and inference rules that describe well-foundedness in MTW has been replaced by a single de nition of classicality in MTC.
Another advantage is that MTC contains some inference rules that were missing in MTW. These are rules Y , M and E in Appendix B.5. In particular, rule Y says that the xed point operator generates a minimal xed point. It is interesting that the theorem of trans nite induction is provable in MTC from the minimality of xed points combined with the recursive de nition of classicality used in MTC. The details are worked out in 12].
A third advantage is the distinction between discontinuous and continuous occurrences of variables introduced in Section 3.1 which allows to treat equations as terms. The syntax of MTW speci es the syntax of terms and well-formed formulas. MTC is simpler in that it does not distinguish between terms and well-formed formulas. This may turn out to be convenient in computer assisted proof systems for MTC because it allows to represent both theorems and inference rules as terms. The notion of discontinuous occurrences permits the inference rule a = T`a which is also valid in the systems of Feferman 8 The correspondence between the classes W and C of well-founded and classical maps, respectively, may now be formulated as follows: Any well-founded map is classical. Any non-empty, coherent class of well-founded maps has a greatest lower bound, and that greatest lower bound is classical. Any classical map is the lower bound of a coherent class of well-founded maps.
Hence, the class C of classical maps can be seen as the closure of W under greatest lower bounds of non-empty, coherent sets. An important di erence between W and C is: For all well-founded maps g except T there exists a well-founded map h such that h < g. In general, a map over I is a tree where each node is labelled by t , f or b , where each edge is labelled by an element of I, where each node labelled f has one downward edge for each element of I, and where each node labelled If I is a set, if x 2 I and if g is a map over I, then we de ne g applied to x, denoted g 0 x , to be the subtree of g attached to the edge labelled x that extends downwards from the root of g. As an example, if g is the map in Figure  1 
Modelling of maps
Let t, f and b be three distinct objects. For all maps g over I we de ne r(g) to be the label of the root of g. Hence, r(T) = t, r(?) = b and r(g) = f for all maps g over I except T and ?.
Let I <! denote the set of nite lists hx 1 ; : : : ; x n i of elements of I. For all maps g over I and all x = hx 1 ; : : : ; x n i 2 I <! let g x] denote g 0 x 0 1 0 x n . As an example, h h2; 1; 2; 1; 2; 1i] = h where h is the map in Figure 2 . If x is the empty tuple h i, then g x] denotes g itself.
If g is a map over I and if x 2 I <! , then r(g x]) will be referred to as the label indexed by x. As an example, if g is the map in Figure 1 
-continuity
For all sets A and , A is said to be -small if A has cardinality strictly less than . From now on let be an in nite set. 
We shall refer to elements of M D as -continuous maps over D.
Maps over R and maps over maps over R
At this point a few examples may show useful. Let R be the set of real numbers, let Z R be the set of integers, and let G = (G; ) = M R be the p.o of maps over R. We 
-premodels
We have now seen maps over f1; 2; 3g, maps over R and R-continuous maps over maps over R. A model of MTC needs to satisfy more than this, partly because of the classical maps, partly because MTC contains inference rules that were missing in MTW.
From now on assume that there exist strongly inaccessible ordinals, assume that is the least strongly inaccessible ordinal and assume that is a regular cardinal greater than .
A -premodel P of MTC is a structure (D; a; C; q) which satis es the ve properties below plus one more property which is stated in Section 2. This de nes the notion of applying a map g to an argument x which was rst mentioned in Section 2.1. This concludes a circle: informal considerations about application of maps led to a representation of maps which was re ned into a model of maps which allows to de ne application.
Classical maps
For all S D and x; y 2 D de ne x = S y , 8z 2 S <! : a(x)(z) = a(y)(z). For all x; y 2 D <! de ne x = S y by hx 1 ; ; x m i = S yhy 1 ; ; y n i , m = n^x 1 = y 1^ ^x m = y m Let P (A) denote the set of -small subsets of A. Let C 0 be the least subset of D which satis es g 2 C 0 , 8x 2 C : g 0 x 2 C 09 V 2 P (C 0 )8x; y 2 C <! : (x = V y ) a(g)(x) = a(g)(y)) The existence of such a C 0 is easy to verify. For all x 2 D and A D let "x = fy 2 D j x yg and "A = S f"x j x 2 Ag. A -premodel P of MTC is a structure (D; a; C; q) which satis es the ve properties in Section 2.6 plus the one below:
C 0 = "C 3 Presentation of MTC
Syntax
The syntax V of variables and T of terms of MTC reads: V ::= x 1 j x 2 j T ::= V j T j T T j V:T j P j " j 9 j (T ) j T = T The construct T T has higher priority than V:T , which in turn has higher priority than T = T , so that e.g. x 1 :x 1 x 1 = x 2 means ( x 1 :(x 1 x 1 )) = x 2 .
An occurrence of a variable v in a term t is said to be discontinuous if v occurs free in a subterm t 0 of t which has one of the forms (t 00 ) or t 00 = t 000 . Occurrences that are not discontinuous are said to be continuous. As an example, the second occurrence of x 1 in Px 1 x 2 (x 1 = x 1 :x 1 ) is discontinuous whereas the other occurrences of variables are continuous.
The following purely syntactical restriction is put on terms of MTC: Discontinuous occurrences of variables are not allowed to be bound. As an example, x 1 :(x 1 = T) is not a well-formed term.
Proofs
A proof in MTC is a sequence of terms in which each term is either an instances of an axiom scheme of follows from previous terms in the sequence by an inference rule. All axioms and inference rules of MTC are listed in Appendix B.5.
The interpretation of a proof is that it proves the last term in the proof, i.e. it proves that the last term in the proof equals T for all values of free variables.
Truth, equality and application
The term T in Section 3.1 denotes the value T de ned in Section 2. however, that terms may be equal in map theory without being -equivalent. This holds even for terms that contain only variables, abstraction and application. The notion of equality in map theory is the semantic notion introduced in Section 2.2 and this semantic notion is not fully captured by -equivalence).
Having abstraction and application allows to de ne the xed point operator QND together with the map P described in Section 3.5 allows to develop classical propositional calculus (c.f. 11, 2, 12]). In the present paper, only the intended meaning of axioms and inference rules will be stated. The details of why they express the intended meaning and how they are used is stated in 12].
Selection
The map P is best described by the following three axioms:
PT Selection PabT = a. which is a discontinuous construct in the sense that free occurrences of variables in a = b are discontinuous occurrences. inherits the discontinuity from = so that free occurrences of variables in a b are discontinuous, and no is allowed to bind a variable occurrence that is free in a subterm of form a b.
We may now state three further inference rules and one more axiom: 
Simple existential quanti cation
The quanti er 9 is a particularly primitive quanti er. 9g = T if gx = T for some x 2 D and 9g = ? otherwise. Contrary to 9, which is de ned in Section B.4, 9g cannot be false. Here we use the choice function q from the premodel (D; a; C; q). The requirement q(;) 2 C D ensures that (g) is a map even when gx 6 = T for all maps x. The following axioms describe 9: ! 9 Existence ab ! 9a 9! Existence 9a ! a (a) ? 9 Existence 9a = ? 9a Axiom ! 9 expresses that if ab is true for some particular b, then 9a is true. Axiom 9! expresses that if ax is true for some x then, in particular, it is true for x = (a). Axiom ? 9 expresses that 9a equals either T or ?. See Appendix B.4 for de nitions of a ! b and ?a. The map " is Hilberts "-operator 13] . The map " allows to de ne many auxiliary concepts such as the universal and existential quanti ers (c.f. Appendix B.4) and to develop rst order predicate calculus. Furthermore, C is rich enough to allow all sets of ZFC to be modelled by classical maps which allows to de ne set membership and prove all axioms and inference rules of ZFC inside MTC. The details may be found in 11, 12] .
The constructs introduced so far allows to de ne the map`(the de nition is stated in Appendix B.4). Now let The former is expressed directly by Axiom Q3 and the latter is expressed indirectly by Axiom Q4.
Conclusion
The most immediate translation of Russells paradoxical sentence fx j x 6 2 xg 2 fx j x 6 2 xg into MTC is the term ( x::(xx))( x::(xx)) whose value is ?. Hence, Russells paradox is essentially avoided by having a third truth value ?
which is the value of terms that make a computer loop inde nitely. An important point in MTC is that this third truth value can be introduced without loosing the classical, semantic avour of the theory and without resort to intuitionistic logic.
The above translation of Russells paradox to MTC translates set abstraction to -abstraction, which gives insight to how Russells paradox is avoided. As noted in Section 1.3, set abstraction is not the same as -abstraction, so one may also look at how Russells paradox is avoided when modelling set abstraction as in 11]. This turns out to be trivial, however, since that modelling ensures that all sets are well-founded so that all sets x satisfy x 6 2 x. Furthermore, that modelling ensures that classes that contain all sets are not sets themselves.
A map x in MTC is classical if`x = T wherè : = f:f T (8x:`(fx))^ 9S:`S^8x8y: x 2 S y ) fx fy
The precise structure and meaning of this de nition is not important here. The important observation is that the de nition of`is recursive in that`occurs on the right hand side of : = (recursive de nitions are shorthand for de nitions that use the xed point operator Y explicitly).
The two occurrences of`in the de nition combined with the minimality of xed points implies that classical maps are well-founded in two, distinct ways. The rst occurrence of`makes classical maps well-founded in the sense that for all classical maps g; x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : there exists an n such that gx 1 x n = T. This kind of well-foundedness corresponds to the well-foundedness of sets expressed by the axiom of restriction in ZFC (no in nitely descending 2-chains).
The second occurrence of`makes classical maps well-founded in a much more subtle sense. The closest analogue in ZFC to this well-foundedness is the limitation of size present in ZFC. However, maps contain more structure than sets and the second kind of well-foundedness is more a limitation of complexity than just a simple limitation of size. In any case, it is this second kind of well-foundedness that avoids Burali-Fortis paradox.
The rst kind of well-foundedness does not avoid paradoxes. If the rst kind of well-foundedness is abandoned, if the second kind is kept, and if the representation of sets used in 11] is used, then the representable sets become those of Aczel's AFA set theory 1] (the one in which the equation X = fXg has exactly one solution). Hence, it is consistent to allow in nite descending 2-chains because the paradoxes are avoided by the second kind of well-foundedness.
As noted by Aczel, all known theories about non-well-foundedness share the peculiarity that they start by constructing a well-founded universe and then proceed to the non-well-founded. It is an interesting topic for further work to try to formulate a version of map theory which does not share this peculiarity. Such a theory could be a theory about non-well-founded, classical maps, i.e. maps that satisfy the second kind of well-foundedness without satisfying the rst.
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A Outline of a model of MTC
A.1 The -denotational semantics
The following exposition follows 2] except that in the following exposition, the empty set is -small and -cpos need not have a bottom element. 
A.2 Outline of a model
A model of MTC is outlined in the following. Merely the de nition of the model will be stated. The satisfaction of the axioms and inference rules remains to be proved.
The model construction has many similarities with the construction in Section 8 of 2]. The construction below di ers from that in 2] in the following ways: (1) The domain of the model is constructed as coherent, complete, initial segments of -compact elements rather than coherent, initial segments of -prime elements and the PCS of -prime elements is not constructed at all below. (2) The model construction is based on two xed point constructions rather than one. The rst xed point generates the -compact maps of MTW which is a set large enough to contain the well-founded maps of MTW. Then the well-founded maps are turned into classical maps by discarding information, and then a second xed point construction is used to generate the -compact maps of MTC. Finally, the -premodel of MTC is constructed from coherent, initial segments of -compact elements.
To simplify the exposition, assume that is strongly inaccessible, i.e. assume is the least strongly inaccessible ordinal and assume is a strongly inaccessible ordinal greater than . The assumption that is inaccessible rather than just regular is merely a luxury. x y, x2y, x22y, x 2 S y, x ) y, x) y, x , y, x = y, x y, and x ! y are \and"-associative so that e.g. x y z means (x y)^(y z) and x ) y ) z means (x ) y)^(y ) z). ?, 8 
B.4 De nitions used in axioms

